Vanderbilt University Law School

Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1999

Smoking Status and Public Responses to
Ambiguous Scientific Risk Evidence
W. Kip Viscusi
Wesley A. Magat
Duke University

Joel Hubert
Duke University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
Recommended Citation
W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat, and Joel Hubert, Smoking Status and Public Responses to Ambiguous Scientific Risk Evidence, 66
Southern Economic Journal. 250 (1999)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/115

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Retrieved from DiscoverArchive,
Vanderbilt University’s Institutional Repository
This article appears with the permission of the Southern Economic
Association, © 1999. W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat and Joel
Huber, Smoking Status and Public Responses to Ambiguous
Scientific Risk Evidence. 66 Southern Economic Journal 250 1999.

Smoking Status and Public Responses to Ambiguous Scientific Risk Evidence
Author(s): W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat and Joel Huber
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Oct., 1999), pp. 250-270
Published by: Southern Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1061142 .
Accessed: 16/08/2012 13:36
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

Southern Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Southern Economic Journal.

http://www.jstor.org

Southern Economic Journal 1999, 66(2), 250-270

Status
and
Smoking
Ambiguous Scientific

Public
Risk

Responses

to

Evidence

W. Kip Viscusi,* Wesley A. Magat,t and Joel Hubert
Situations in which individuals receive informationseldom involve scientific consensus over
the level of the risk. When scientific experts disagree, people may process the informationin
an unpredictablemanner.The original data presented here for environmentalrisk judgments
indicate a tendency to place disproportionateweight on the high risk assessment, irrespective
of its source, particularlywhen the experts disagree. Cigarette smokers differ in their risk
informationprocessing from nonsmokersin that they place less weight on the high risk judgment when thereis a divergencein expertopinion. Consequently,they are more likely to simply
average competing risk assessments.

1. Introduction
Most risks that we face are not known with precision. The risks posed by climate change,
the cancer risks created by breast implants, the potential for adverse reactions to a new drug,
and the threat of mad cow disease are all highly uncertain. For example, one prominent British
scientist offered the rather imprecise risk judgment that the human form of mad cow disease,
or Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, would kill from 500 to 500,000 British consumers.' Such uncertainty is the norm rather than the exception. Substantial ambiguity exists regarding the extent
of the hazard even for risks for which there is substantial agreement, such as the hazards of
cigarettes. The extent of the health risks posed by environmental tobacco smoke remain hotly
debated, as some studies indicate substantial risks and others fail to indicate any significant risk.
How do people respond to situations in which there is a diversity of opinion regarding the
level of the risk? Ideally, they should make risk inferences in a rational manner; where we will
take Bayesian learning as the rationality reference point. When there are competing scientific
risk judgments, how people process the information will depend on their prior beliefs, the
precision of their prior beliefs, the risks indicated by the scientific studies, and the weight they
place on these studies. There are many ways in which people might use such scientific studies,
such as by averaging their implications or placing a higher weight on the more credible study.
Some of these changes in risk beliefs in response to new information will be consistent with
rational learning, whereas others may not. In this paper, we present original survey evidence in
* HarvardLaw School, Hauser Hall 302, 1575 MassachusettsAvenue,
Cambridge,MA 02138, USA; E-mail
kip@law.harvard.edu;
correspondingauthor.
t Deceased. FormerlyFuquaSchool of Business, Duke University.
t FuquaSchool of Business, Duke University,Durham,NC 27708, USA; E-mailjch8@mail.duke.edu.
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ProtectionAgency.
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'See "Mad Cows and Englishmen," The Economist (March 30, 1996), p. 25. Also see Viscusi (1998) for a general
discussion of risk ambiguityresults in the literature.
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which respondentsconsider a variety of informationscenarios, making it possible to assess the
consistency of the treatmentof different scientific risk studies.
To the extent that behavioralpredictionsare possible based on evidence in the literature,
it would suggest that people may exhibit anomalousbehaviorwhen thereis ambiguityregarding
the magnitudeof the risk. Consider,for example, the implicationsof the classic Ellsberg (1961)
paradox.In that experiment,subjects consideredtwo urns, one of which offered a known probability of winning a prize, whereas the other offered an uncertainchance of winning a prize.
Respondents were averse to ambiguous chances of winning the prize, compared to a lottery
ticket with precisely known probabilities and the same mean probabilityvalue. Researchers
have identified similar phenomenawith respect to small probabilitiesof a loss, because there
is often a tendency toward ambiguity aversion that is not consistent with rational expected
utility theory.
The issues addressed in this paper representa variant on this ambiguous risk structure.
Moreover,we have coupled the presenceof risk ambiguitywith differentrisk informationsources, whereas in earlier studies, such as Viscusi and Magat (1987), there is no difference in the
source's identity. Suppose that there are two different parties providing risk information,and
their views are different. How do people process the divergent risk judgments? Consider the
situationof an industrialpolluter,which might be expected to have a vested economic interest
in downplayingthe risk or even misrepresentingit. To what extent does it matterwhetherthe
risk evidence is from industryor government?When is individualdifferentiationbetween those
risk sources entirely rational, and is there any reason to believe that people fail to process
diverse risk informationrationally?
The substantivefocus of the study will be on how people respondto differentassessments
of the risk of cancerdue to air pollution. Canceris a chief source of individualrisk that is often
ambiguous. The use of an air pollution context enables us to consider risk estimates in the
policy arena,including both business and government.In each case, respondentswill consider
two different sources of risk informationabout the potential cancer risk. These informational
sources could be both governmentor industry sources, or possibly a mixture of industry and
governmentsources. Because the polluting firm will have less of an incentive to reveal accurate
risk informationabout the hazardsit generatesthan might the government,an interestingeconomic issue is how people will process these divergentriskjudgmentsdependingon theirsource
and the risk levels associated with them. Unequal weighting of such scientific evidence may be
entirely rational. In the case of our study, however, respondents will consider a variety of
different informationalcombinations.Ideally, people should be consistent in how they weight
risk evidence across differentrisk scenarios.
The key issue we explore here is how risk judgments and relative weighting of diverse
scientific evidence varies with personal characteristics.Demographic factors may be consequential. Women, for example, have shown themselves to be more averse to facing health
hazards than are men.2 A personal characteristicof particularsaliency is individual smoking
status.Do people who have self-selected themselves into this extremelydangerousconsumption
activity process risk informationdifferentlythan do nonsmokerswith similardemographicprofiles? The analysis of the distinctive behavior of cigarette smokers with respect to this informational context is of interest since cigarette smoking involves a risk for which there are
2 Hersch (1996) documentsa variety of salient
gender differencesin attitudestowardhealth risks.
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continuingbattles between the cigaretteindustryand governmentofficials focused on the hazards of environmentaltobacco smoke.
The organizationof this paperis as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoreticalstructurefor
the study and the empiricalformulationof the model that will be tested. Section 3 presentsthe
empiricalestimates of the effect of the differentrisk informationsources and the differentrisk
levels on individual risk judgments. Section 4 focuses on the role of smoking status and its
effect on the processingof risk information.As indicatedin the concludingsection 5, individuals
do not treat the different kinds of informationbased solely on the credibility of the source.
Rather,they tend to place disproportionateweight on the high risk assessment,particularlywhen
there are conflicting risk judgments. Cigarettesmokers are less likely to exhibit such alarmist
behavior.

2. Theoretical Structure and Empirical Framework
Theoretical Structure
The basis for the study is a survey of adults in which they considered moving to one of
two areas, area 1 or area 2. Each area posed a risk of cancer,but they differed in terms of how
the risk was characterized.Area 1 posed an uncertaincancer risk level S for which there were
two divergentrisk judgments involving industry,government,or a mix of sources. Area 2 has
cancer risk level R that is estimated with precision and will thus serve as the referencepoint
for the level of the precisely understoodrisk that is equivalent to uncertainrisks. The survey
proceeded iteratively using an interactive computer programuntil respondentsidentified the
known risk R in area 2 that they believed was equivalentto the ambiguousrisk in area 1.
The advantageof considering a move to an undefinednew area is that respondentswill
not bring to bear their prior beliefs regardingtheir currentrisk situation. Each area was, in
effect, an abstractionfor which there was only survey informationregardingthe area'schemical
hazardsbased on two different studies. The study could consequentlybe a pure informational
experimentin which all that transpiredwas an effort by respondentsto find a known risk value
that was equivalent to an area in which there were two studies that differed in terms of the
implied risk level.
The nature of the informationalcontext is noteworthy as well. For personal risk-taking
activities, such as smoking, some researchershave hypothesizedthat people may discount risk
evidence for a risky activity they have chosen. Air pollution, which is the case study for this
analysis, is a hazardoutside of the individual'scontrol. This risk is involuntaryand inflicted
by a pollutingindustryin which the respondenthas no economic interest.Moreover,airpollution
is a public hazardthat poses similar exposures to all, although the actual risks may differ if,
for example, one is asthmatic.The survey design consequently avoids any influence of risk
perceptionsbeing influencedby a desire to justify relatively great personalrisk taking.
The two informationsources were scientists from the pollutingchemical industry(denoted
i)
by and scientists from the government(denoted by g). Respondentsreceived no information
about the natureof the scientific studies or their timeliness, so there was no reason otherwise
to differentiatebetween them. The Appendix presents sample survey questions.
If we let U denote utility in the healthy state and V denote utility with cancer,the task is
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for respondentsto find the value of the known risk R in area2 that gives them the same expected
utility in both locations, or
(1 - S) U + SV= (1 - R)U + RV.

(1)

From the standpointof the survey structure,respondentsare picking the known risk R that
satisfies
R = S.

(2)

Thus, the structureof the utility functions and the characterof the rewards structureare not
consequentialbecause the U and V terms drop out. For this binary lottery, the task is simply
to find the precisely understoodprobabilityR that is equivalentto the subjectiverisk assessment
S in terms of the attractivenessof the chance of getting cancer in that area.
The natureof the study makes the value of the equivalentprecise risk R observable,because
that precise risk value is simply the cancer in area 2, where the risk is known. By construction,
the survey determinesthe value of R that is equal to the respondent'ssubjectiverisk assessment
S, which is not observable. Thus, for S we know the two pieces of risk informationthat are
provided to respondents,which are the low and high risk estimates. Although we do not know
how respondentsuse the informationin altering their subjective risk assessment S, we know
that the result of this process is to get S equal to R, thus making possible an empiricalanalysis
of how people form their risk beliefs.
To impose some structureon the learning process, we will adopt what we call a "naive
Bayesian" model, in which respondentstreat both risk estimates as independentsources of
information.For concreteness, let risk perceptions be characterizedby the beta distribution,
which can assume a wide variety of skewed and symmetric shapes. Suppose that people have
prior beliefs p regardingthe cancer risk, with associated precision aoo.Thus, the informational
content of the prior belief is equivalent to drawing xa0balls from a Benoulli urn, for which a
fractionp indicate a cancer risk. The low-risk informationfrom sourcej (either industry i or
governmentg) indicates a cancer risk Slj with associated precision a,j. Similarly,the high risk
informationindicates a cancer risk s2k with associated precision a2k (either industry i or government g). We will refer to informationthat has a higher precision parameteras being more
"credible." A key assumptionof this naive Bayesian model is that the informationalweight
does not depend on the risk probabilityvalue disclosed. Note that there is no requirementthat
people treat the industry and governmentsources as being equally credible.
The posteriorrisk assessmentS is a linearweighted averageof the differentprobabilities,or
S=

aOt +n Oat +

(s+
aljj

+

OoO+ +
ot

+

+.

f-+

2k

0

o +

+O2k a2

(3)

The weights on p, slj, and s2k are the respective fractions of the total informationreflectedby
each informationsource, where these fractions sum to 1.0.
By design, the experimentalmanipulationgave respondentsevidence from two studies and
did not indicate any overlapbetween them. If the studies were overlappingand not independent,
the interpretationof the informationweights changes somewhat, but one is still led to a linear
formulationsuch as that in Equation 3.3 For example, assuming a normal distributionrather
than a beta distribution,the weights on the two risk studies are the amount of information
3 See Zeckhauser
(1971) and Viscusi (1997) for further analysis of the overlapping case.
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unique to the two risk studies divided by the total amount of nonoverlappinginformation.
Similarly, in Equation 3 the weights are the fraction of the total informationassociated with
each informationsource. Thus, the presence of overlappinginformationsimply alters the interpretationof the coefficients.
A variety of symmetryconditions emerge from this formulation.The key propertydriving
these results is that the informationalvalue of a given source is independent of the other
information source (i.e., nonoverlappinginformation).Let Low(j, k) denote the information
weight on the low risk assessment when the low risk value is from sourcej and the high risk
value is from source k. The high risk informationweight High(j, k) is defined analogously.If
the same party is providing both risk judgments, the informationweights should be the same
because thereis no reasongiven in the survey for why a high or low risk value from an identical
source should differ in terms of credibility.Consequently,
Low(i, i) = High(i, i),

(4)

Low(g, g) = High(g, g).

(5)

and

When there are two informationsources, the weights implied by Equation 3 always give the
same weight on a particularparty'srisk information,whetherit is the high or low riskjudgment,
or

Low(g, i) = High(i, g),

(6)

Low(i, g) = High(g, i).

(7)

and

Equally credible informationfor both parties, which is the situation in which the precision
parameteris the same for both parties, leads to Low(j, k) = High(j, k) in all instances.
Deriving Equations 4-7 simply involves implementingEquation 3 for the specific case
indicated.The precision parameterdepends on the informationsource, not on the implied risk
value, so the informationalcontent of a governmentstudy is Otgand is ac for an industrystudy.
Thus, we have
Low(i, i) = cxi/(o0 + cxi + a,o),

(8)

which is identical to High(i, i). Similarly,
Low(g, i) = oxg/(ao + Otg+ xOt),

(9)

High(i, g) = ag/(axo + xi + cxg),

(10)

and

which satisfies Equation6. The other conditions also follow in a straightforwardmanner.
One could envision more complicated learning processes that were rational and did not
satisfy the propertiesof this naive Bayesian model. People's processing of risk evidence may
depend not only on the partymakingthe assessmentbut also on the risk estimate.For example,
results from industry studies may have a greatereffect when the estimates are high if people
believe that the industrywould conceal unfavorableinformationunless it was particularlycompelling. The empirical analysis will permit a broad analysis of such influences. However, the

Smoking and AmbiguousRisk Evidence

255

interpretationof whetherresults imply a form of irrationalityhinges on adoption of the naive
Bayesian model specified above.
Empirical Formulation
ImplementingEquation 3 empirically is straightforward.The dependent variable is the
equilibratingknown risk R that respondentsequated to their subjective risk assessments S for
the area with uncertainrisk assessments. Thus, for purposes of estimating Equation3 empirically, the dependentvariableequals R. The prior beliefs term in Equation3 is not observable,
but it can be capturedby a constantterm Poand a linear function 1[X of a vector X of personal
characteristics. However, the information weight ao/(xa + a,j + c2k) depends on the identity of

the two informationsources, as these affect the values of a,j and t2k in the denominator.To
capturethis influence, separatedummy variableswill be included for the particularinformation
source combination (e.g., industry for the low risk study and government for the high risk
study), thus permittingthe value of 30 to vary. The coefficients 32of the low risk estimate s,
and the coefficient f3 of the high risk estimate s2 representthe relative informationalcontent
of those risk assessments as well. These values will also be permittedto vary to reflect the
particularinformationcombinationthat is present. Abstractingfrom the complications arising
because the coefficients vary with informationcombination(j, k), the estimatingequationis of
the form
S = Po + ,1x + P2S1 + 13S2 + E,

(11)

where E is a randomerrorterm. The values of P1, 12, and P3 will be invariantwith respect to
(j, k) in the case of separateregressions performedwithin different (j, k) informationcombinations. However, in runs using the pooled data, these 12 and P3 parameterswill be permitted
to vary with each of the informationsource combinations (j, k). If we let the governmentgovernmentinformationcase be the baseline situation,or the omitted dummy variable group,
the pooled estimatingequationis
S = o3 + P3(i, i) + P,(g, i) + Po(i, g) + PiX + 2S1+ P2(i, i)sI + 32(g,i)sl
+

1
2(i, g)s +

3s +

3(i, i)s2 +

3(g, i)s2 + P3(i, g)s2 + e.

(12)

Even permittingthe relative informationweights to vary with the informationtype may
not be a sufficiently general formulation.The informationcontent parametersax, axj, and c2k
in Equation 3 may vary with personal characteristics.Section 4 will explore the most salient
of these interactions,which is the relationshipbetween smoking status and the information
weights.
The Data Base
The sample used in this study consisted of 143 adult participants,who were recruitedby
a marketresearchfirm to participatein the study. The Appendix summarizesthe sample characteristics.Respondentstook the survey using a computerprogramthat proceededinteractively
until the equilibratingR value was obtained. The sequence of pairwise comparisons varied
depending on the respondent'sprevious answers so as to produce convergence. The computer
format also eliminates interviewerbias and may produce more accurateresponses to sensitive
questions dealing with personalcharacteristics,such as age.
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Table 1. Mean Indifference Points for Respondents by Information Source
InformationSource Combinations
Scenario

OverallMean

(i, i)

94.92

100.26

(g, g)

(i, g)

(g, i)

91.49

99.00

89.90

(10,200)

112.90

107.78

115.59

125.03

107.35

(100,300)
(200,400)
(615,735)

208.71
310.63
689.69

200.61
295.92
695.38

210.61
332.88
666.89

221.25
318.88
623.75

213.11
315.74
722.20

(100,900)

548.53

551.54

605.51

547.06

504.59

(80,100)

As is indicated in the sample questions in the Appendix, the respective risks in area 1 and
area 2 were for "the chance of getting cancer from the pollution in each area." The different
information combinations received by respondents were two government studies (g, g), two
industry studies (i, i), an industry low risk study with a government high risk study (i, g) and
a government low risk study with an industry high risk study (g, i).
The different levels of cancer risks varied across subjects and information sources. The
survey included six different risk combinations for each information source combination, where
the risks were in terms of cases of cancer per million residents in area 1: (100, 300), (200,
400), (100, 900), (10, 200), (80, 100), and (615, 735).
Table 1 provides a summary of the mean responses for each of the six scenarios and each
of the four informational combinations. In every case, the overall mean responses were somewhat greater than the midpoint of the range of the two studies. The risk range varied both in
absolute and percentage terms because the nature of the responses was not clear a priori. For
example, in comparing the responses to (100, 300) to (100, 900), one might hypothesize that
people would focus more on the high risk estimate when the studies become more disparate.
Or they might simply dismiss the high risk estimate if the low risk value was from a more
credible source, as in the case of the (g, i) results for (100, 900), for which the response is 505,
which is well below the overall sample mean. Because of the substantial differences in responses
across individuals, the subsequent regression results are more illuminating in highlighting the
patterns of interest.

3. Empirical Results for Basic Learning Models
The regression estimates of equation 12 appear in Table 2. These estimates are for the
entire sample, where results from the different types of information provided to the respondents
are pooled in a single regression. In each case, the dependent variable is the equilibrating risk
(i.e., the number of cancer cases per one million population) in area 2 that the respondent found
to be indifferent to the situation in area 1, in which two risk assessments were provided. Subsequent results will disaggregate the findings by information group, but there are no significant
differences between the pooled and aggregate results.4
Column 1 in Table 2 includes the basic elements of the risk belief model. In recognition
of the individual's prior risk beliefs, the equation includes an intercept term as well as a series
4 The

pertinentF-tests suggest that pooling is appropriate.
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of personal characteristicvariables pertainingto the respondent'sage, race, gender, years of
schooling, income level, and maritalstatus. Column 1 in Table 2 permitsthe interceptterm to
vary across differentinformationcombinations.The equationincludes dummy variablesfor the
particularinformationgroup in which the respondentparticipated.For example, governmentindustrypertainsto the situationin which the low risk value was from the government,and the
high risk assessment was from industry.Thus, the informationalcontent provided by the scientific studies can potentiallyinfluence the degree to which priorrisk beliefs affect the overall
risk perceptionby alteringthe relative weight accordedto one's prior beliefs.
Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates and the standarderrors in parentheses.Use of
ordinaryleast squaresto estimate the regressionin a situationin which the dependentvariable
is bounded (i.e., it cannot be below zero) creates potentialproblemsof heteroskedasticity;as a
result we also report the heteroskedasticity-adjustedstandarderrors in brackets.5Moreover,
appropriatecalculationof the standarderrorsmust also take into accountthat respondentsconsidered multiple risk informationscenarios.To account for such influences, the bracketedstandarderrorsare the robustand clusteredstandarderrorsshown in brackets,which were calculated
using the proceduredescribed in Huber (1967). The linear model in Equation 12 offers the
strengththat it is directly linked to the theoreticalstructurein Equation3, which is also linear.
From a Bayesian learning standpoint,the principalvariablesof interestin Table 2 are the
coefficients on the low and high risk variables. These weights simply representthe relative
proportionof risk informationassociated with the low and high risk information;that is, the
fraction of the available informationlinked to each source. Based on the theoreticalmodel in
Equation 3 above, these proportionswill sum to 1.0 if no weight is given to the prior belief
and will be less than 1.0 if there is some nonzero proportionof the informationalcontent
accorded to the prior.If the two risk assessments are treatedsymmetrically,then these coefficients will be equal. In the extreme situation in which respondentsview the risk studies as
being the dominant source of informationand the prior risk beliefs have no role whatsoever,
the sum of the low and high risk coefficients will equal 1.0. If prior risk beliefs are consequential,then the sum of the low and high risk coefficients will be less than 1.0. The estimated
sum of these coefficients is 1.01 (column 1), but this value is not significantlydifferent from
1.0.6 This result is consistent with the prediction of the Bayesian learning model that the informationalweights on the low and high risk informationsources should sum to a value less
than or equal to 1.0. One can, however, reject the hypothesis that the informationweights are
equal, because the high risk weight is greater.7The naive Bayesian model's symmetrictreatment
of information can be rejected. People do not treat the informationwith equal weight but,
instead, accord a greaterweight to the higher risk judgment. The informationsource dummy
variables are not statistically significant so prior beliefs are not affected by the source, as is
consistent with the theory.
5 For the

analogouslinearprobabilitymodels, estimatesof the coefficientswill not be efficient so thata heteroskedasticity
adjustmentis appropriate.See Maddala(1983, pp. 15-16). In our case, the dependentvariableis not a 0-1 dichotomous
variable,nor is it censored or truncated,as the values of the variableshould naturallyfall in the interval [0, 1]. There
were no predictedvalues outside the [0, 1] range, so the endpointconstraintswere not binding.
6 To explore whetherthe value of the sum of the two risk coefficients was differentfrom 1.0, column 1 in Table 2 was
reestimated,replacingLow Risk and High Risk by (Low Risk + High Risk)/2. The estimatedcoefficient is 1.038 with
an associatedstandarderrorof 0.021, so that 1.0 is within the confidenceinterval.
7 One can reject the hypothesis that the Low Risk and High Risk coefficients are equal, as the associated F-statisticis
10.52 and the critical F.05(1884) is 3.84.
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Table 2. Risk PerceptionRegression Results for Pooled InformationGroupsa
Coefficients
(StandardErrors)
[Robustand ClusteredStandardErrors]

Intercept
Low Risk
High Risk
Industry-Industry
Government-Industry
Industry-Government

1

2

3

30.327
(26.622)
[40.303]
0.455*
(0.022)
[0.023]
0.559*
(0.015)
[0.019]
0.895
(9.093)
[6.739]
11.755
(10.576)
[8.357]
2.815
(11.898)
[8.654]

41.294
(28.347)
[39.612]
0.577*
(0.039)
[0.054]
0.498*
(0.026)
[0.030]
-7.912
(16.551)
[12.088]
-5.826
(19.208)
[13.552]
15.869
(21.734)
[15.471]
-0.113
(0.054)
[0.078]
0.064
(0.038)
[0.049]
-0.244*
(0.058)
[0.082]
0.139*
(0.040)
[0.062]
-0.236*
(0.077)
[0.125]
0.057
(0.051)
[0.065]
-0.533
(0.314)
[0.537]
0.792
(21.572)
[47.402]
20.307
(8.138)
[14.177]
-14.785
(7.859)
[13.476]

31.041
(28.502)
[40.260]
0.581*
(0.041)
[0.061]
0.520*
(0.027)
[0.029]
-7.800
(16.498)
[12.069]
-5.488
(19.146)
[13.475]
17.761
(21.674)
[15.694]
-0.119
(0.054)
[0.077]
0.067
(0.037)
[0.049]
-0.246*
(0.058)
[0.082]
0.139*
(0.040)
[0.062]
-0.241*
(0.077)
[0.127]
0.054
(0.051)
[0.066]
-0.531
(0.313)
[0.538]
0.676
(21.502)
[47.430]
20.304
(8.111)
[14.192]
-14.664
(7.833)
[13.468]

Low Risk x Industry-Industry
High Risk x Industry-Industry
Low Risk x Government-Industry
High Risk x Government-Industry
Low Risk x Industry-Government
High Risk X Industry-Government
Age
Age Missing
Nonwhite or Other
Male

-0.556
(0.315)
[0.562]
2.322
(21.596)
[49.519]
23.982*
(7.935)
[14.478]
-15.969
(7.900)
[14.231]

Smoking and Ambiguous Risk Evidence

259

Table 2. Continued
Coefficients
(StandardErrors)
[Robustand ClusteredStandardErrors]
1

2

3

-0.328
(1.440)
[2.337]
4.9E-5

-0.522
(1.433)
[2.391]
2.2E-5

-0.513
(1.428)
[2.393]
1.9E-5

(17.9E-5)

(17.9E-5)

(17.9E-5)

[22.1E-5]
-5.423
(13.531)
[19.532]
-27.074*
(8.361)
[11.899]

[21.6E-5]
-9.805
(13.448)
[19.973]
-19.531
(8.392)
[12.026]
-19.687*
(8.718)
[11.737]

0.81

0.82

[21.6E-5]
-9.882
(13.404)
[19.965]
-19.506
(8.364)
[12.036]
14.293
(15.150)
[9.219]
-0.003
(0.047)
[0.047]
-0.076*
(0.033)
[0.040]
0.82

Education
Income
Income Missing
Single
Smoker
Smoker X Low Risk
Smoker x High Risk
R2

Asterisksdenote coefficients that are statisticallysignificantat the 95% confidencelevel, one-tailedtest, using the
standarderrors.
heteroskedasticity-adjusted
aThe sample size is 858 for all columns.

Column 2 in Table2 explores the characterof the influenceson risk beliefs in much greater
detail. In particular,both the low and high risk coefficients interact with three of the four
informationalsets to reflect the possible differentinformationweights for the parties.The omitted interactionis for the g-g combination.These differencesare statisticallysignificant,because
one can rejectthe hypothesisthatthis set of interactionsis zero.8This informationalcombination
forms the baseline risk coefficient estimatesin column 2, as respondentsplace a relative weight
of 0.58 on the low risk informationprovided by the governmentand a weight of 0.50 on the
high risk informationprovidedby the government.
To obtain comparableestimates of the effect of different informationsources on the informationalweights, one must add the coefficient of the interactionterm to these low and high
risk coefficients. As it turns out, it mattersa great deal who has providedthe risk information.
In the case of the i-i interactionset for which all informationis from industry, the low risk
weight is less than that for the g-g combination,and the high risk weight is higher than the gg combination.These differences are statisticallysignificantfor the unweightedstandarderrors
but not for the heteroskedasticity-adjusted
standarderrors.The relative weight on the high risk
informationis 0.56, comparedwith a relative weight of 0.46 on the low risk information.The
8 The pertinentF-statistic for the constraintimposed by

critical F005(7837)value is 2.03.

column 1 comparedwith column 2 in Table 2 is 4.22, and the
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point estimatesfor the i-i mix of informationleads to a higher weight on the high risk outcome
than the low risk outcome, which is a reversalof the patternobserved for the g-g information
set.
The differences become particularlystark and statistically significantonce there is a mix
of risk informationsources. In the case of the g-i risk informationcombination,the low risk
informationprovidedby the governmenthas a much lower weight than in the g-g combination,
and the high risk informationprovided by the industry has a more substantialweight. If the
polluting industry itself believes the risk is likely to be high, people are particularlylikely to
believe that estimate as opposed to a lower risk estimate by the government.The net result is
that in the g-i situation,the informationalweight placed on the governmentrisk informationis
0.33, and the weight placed on the industry informationis 0.64, or almost twice as much. In
the situationwhere there is a discrepancybetween the informationsources, the industryinformation at the high risk end receives a very high weight, even higher than in the situation in
which the industrywas the source of both the low and high risk information.Perhapssomewhat
surprisingly,the high risk assessment by industry is more consequential when the low risk
assessment is given by the governmentrisk experts, comparedwith experts from the polluting
firm.
The final variantof informationthat is providedis the i-g risk informationcase. Do people
dismiss the polluting industry'srisk estimate when the governmentstudies suggest the risk is
higher than do the industry's?The low risk weight for the industryrisk informationin the i-g
situationis smaller than the weight placed on the governmentlow risk informationin the g-g
case. The net effect is that the relative weight placed on the industry low risk informationin
the i-g case is 0.34, and the relative weight placed on the governmentlow risk informationis
0.57.
Respondents treat the high risk informationas being more informative. This patternis
borneout in the interactionresults,especially in the g-i and i-g cases in which therearedifferent
informationsources. This predilectionfor treatingworst case scenarios as more consequential
is consistent with observed biases in government risk regulation programsas well, because
these risk policies tend to be guided by the maximumrisk level or the upper end of the 95%
confidencelevel of the risk range (see Nichols and Zeckhauser1986; Viscusi 1992a). Individual
respondentsdisplay a similarorientationin that fear of the worst case scenarioreceives greater
weight than does the low risk assessment.
This patternreflects what one might view as risk aversion in learning.When faced with a
lottery on two risk assessments, the informationallyrisk-averse respondentshave a certainty
equivalent probabilitythat is higher than the expected value because of the disproportionate
weight on the high risk assessment.9Such risk aversionin learningappearsmore prevalentwhen
different parties are the sources of the conflicting judgments. This phenomenonis, however,
independentof the shape of individualpreferencesand the presenceof risk aversionfor changes
in wealth.
Table 3 reportsthe regressionestimates for Equation 11 for each risk informationsubsamThese
results parallel the earlier findings almost identically. In the g-g risk information
ple.
the
low
risk informationweight is 0.58, and the high risk informationweight is 0.50. The
case,
i-i informationalweights are almost identical to those implied by Table 1: the low risk weight
9 With normal risk aversion, 11 individualsfacing a lottery will attach to it a certain monetaryequivalentbelow its
expected value.
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Table 3. Risk PerceptionRegression Results for Different InformationGroups
Coefficients
(StandardErrors)
[Robustand ClusteredStandardErrors]

Intercept
Low Risk

GovernmentGovernment

IndustryIndustry

GovernmentIndustry

IndustryGovernment

46.244
(43.308)
[36.774]
0.582*
(0.036)

72.783
(48.499)
[58.378]
0.467*
(0.039)
[0.060]
0.561*
(0.029)
[0.039]
-0.720
(0.565)
[0.665]
-1.475
(38.823)
[54.328]
12.966
(14.658)
[17.773]

-7.689
(65.626)
[57.600]
0.329*
(0.048)

8.326
(71.663)
[69.008]
0.341*
(0.068)

[0.055]

[0.101]
0.555*

[0.055]

High Risk
Age

0.498*
(0.024)
[0.030]
-0.506
(0.509)

[0.613]
Age Missing
Nonwhite
or Other
Male
Education
Income
Income Missing
Single
Smoker
R2
N

-29.714

(34.826)
[56.151]
30.688*
(13.175)
[16.168]
-13.188

(12.697)
[13.668]
-0.690
(2.320)
[2.018]
4.3E-5
(29.0E-5)
[24.0E-5]
-19.778

(21.796)
[20.297]
-25.637*
(13.554)
[14.528]
-31.182*
(14.105)
[14.983]
0.83
286

- 16.097

(14.257)
[15.859]
-2.742
(2.586)
[3.421]
3.7E-5
(32.5E-5)
[25.4E-5]
11.638
(24.269)
[23.533]
-21.570
(15.024)
[14.824]
-24.560*
(15.728)
[12.466]
0.81
286

0.640*
(0.034)

(0.045)

[0.050]

[0.055]

-0.048
(0.779)

-0.815
(0.839)
[0.613]
20.248
(59.116)
[47.726]
22.395
(22.488)
[19.738]
-0.277
(20.812)
[23.282]
2.922
(3.679)
[4.257]
2.4E-5
(50.9E-5)
[38.2E-5]
-43.830
(36.167)
[47.805]
-4.403
(22.384)
[22.122]
-5.576
(24.512)
[24.777]
0.78
118

[0.772]

41.326
(52.844)
[47.444]
15.233
(19.751)
[20.742]
-26.356
(19.366)
[19.327]
1.108
(3.649)
[3.761]
4.1E-5
(43.2E-5)
[27.7E-5]
-2.909
(33.037)
[29.243]
-15.174

(21.134)
[18.249]
-2.163
(20.879)
[15.278]
0.83
168

Asterisksdenote coefficients that are statisticallysignificantat the 95% confidencelevel, one-tailedtest, using the
standarderrors.
heteroskedasticity-adjusted

is 0.47, and the high risk weight is 0.56. Similarly, the g-i low risk weight is 0.33, and the
high risk weight is 0.64, as in the pooled regression case; in the i-g case the low risk weight
is 0.34, and the high risk weight is 0.56. Permittingall the coefficients to change and not simply
the risk informationvariableconsequentlyhas negligible effects on the influence of the relative
informationalweights on the two differentinformationsources presentedto respondents.

262

Viscusi, Magat, and Huber

There are, however, some notable differences. In particular,the race, marital status, and
smoking status variablesare statisticallysignificantin the g-g case, but only smoking status is
ever significantin the other separateinformationalgroup regression results. Overall, risk perceptions tend to be higher for nonwhites and for single respondents,and they tend to be lower
for smokers.
The nature of the departuresfrom rational behavior is reflected in the characterof the
divergences of the estimates in Table 3 from the predictedparameterrelationships.Equations
4, 5, 6, and 7 above summarizethe various symmetryhypothesesfor the naive Bayesian model
on which they are based. This referencepoint assumes that informationalweights depend only
on the particularsource and not on the risk estimate or the other informationprovided. Consequentially,"irrational"observed behaviormay be consistent with other,more complex rational learning models. The first set of symmetry hypotheses in Equations4 and 5 state that in
situations in which both high and low risk informationare from the same party, the relative
informationalweights should be identical. The low risk weight is greaterin the g-g case, and
the high risk weight is greaterin the i-i cases. These differences are statisticallysignificantin
both the Low(g, g) and High(g, g) case, as well as for the Low(i, i) and High(i, i).'1 In each
instance, however, the magnitudesof the differences are not great, as the weights are roughly
0.5.

Substantialdifferencesarise once informationis providedby differentinformationsources.
The informationalweight conditions characterizedby Equations 6 and 7 are each violated."
Moreover,there is a consistent patternto the violations because the high risk weight is consistently largerthan the low risk weight irrespectiveof whetherthe high risk informationis from
the governmentor industry.It is not so much the identity of the party conveying the high risk
informationbut, rather,the fact that there is a diversity of views. As one would expect, the gap
between the high and low risk informationalweights is greaterwhen the high risk assessment
is from industry,but in each case there is a substantialspread between the size of the informationalweights, rangingfrom 0.23 to 0.30. In situationsin which thereis a diversityof views,
respondentsplace from one and one-half to two times as great a weight on the high risk
assessment as on the low risk assessment.
Many of the disparities that are observed reflect consistent patternsof influence. When
there are different informationsources, the low risk weight is not significantly different for
either Low(g, i) = 0.33 or Low(i, g) = 0.34.12 Similarly, the high risk weights High(g, i) =

0.64 and High(i, g) = 0.56 are fairly similarin magnitudeand not statisticallydistinguishable.'3
Similarly, one cannot reject the joint hypothesis that Low(g, i) = Low(i, g) and High(g, i) =
High(i, g).14 Thatthereis a diversityof opinion seems to be more consequentialthanthe identity
of the diverse views. The parallels of the estimated low and high risk weights are substantial
but not complete when both informationsources are identical. The high risk weights-High(g,
g) = 0.50 and High(i, i) = 0.56-are not significantly different, but the low risk weights10The pertinentF-statisticfor the hypothesisthat Low(g, g) = High(g, g) is 20.39, which is above the criticalF0.05(1837)
value of 3.84, and the F-value for the hypothesisthat Low(i, i) = High(i, i) is 4.89, which is just above the cutoff
level.
" More specifically, the F-statistic for the hypothesis that Low(g, i) = High(i, g) is 13.06, and the statistic for the
hypothesisthat High(g, i) = Low(i, g) is 16.39, each of which exceeds the critical F005(1837)value of 3.84.
12 The
pertinentF-statisticis 0.010, which is below the critical F005(1837)value of 3.84.
'3 The calculatedF-statisticis 2.34, which is below the cutoff value of 3.84.
14 The F-statistichere is 1.47, while the critical F005(2837)is 4.61.
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Low(g, g) = 0.58 and Low(i, i) = 0.47-do differ.15From the standpointof the predictionsof
a rational learning model, these values need not be identical, but they could be in the naive
Bayesian case in which informationfrom both parties is equally credible.
The effect of these kinds of influences are also reflectedin the hypotheses that one would
develop if governmentinformationwere more credible than industry information.The outlier
is Low(g, i), because the relativeinformationweight given to the industry'shigh risk assessment
in this context is so large that the fractionof the informationalcontent accordedto the government's low risk value is reduced, leading to a violation of the hypothesized dominance of
government risk information. The expected large weight that government risk information
should receive in the presenceof industryrisk informationis consequentlynot borneout because
of the substantialattentioncommandedby the industry'shigh risk assessment in a situationof
conflictingrisk viewpoints. Similarly,if governmentrisk informationwere dominant,one would
expect High(g, i) to be the smallest entry among the informationcombinations,whereasin fact,
it is the largest because of the extreme weight that respondentsplace on the high risk estimate
provided by industrywhen the other party providingrisk informationis the government.
The situationin which industryinformationis more credibleappearsless plausiblea priori
and can also be rejected. The largest expected informationalweight when industryrisk information is dominantis for Low(i, g), which is close to being the smallest.
Overall,the greatestdeparturesfrom the predictionsof the Bayesian learningmodel pertain
to the context in which individualsreceive informationfrom differentsources.In these contexts,
the weight given to the high risk assessment is excessive given the informationalcontent generally accorded to that informationsource. In other respects, behavior is quite reasonable.Individuals display a responsiveness to the information provided, with positive information
weights that sum to an amountthat is not statisticallydistinguishablefrom 1.0.
One should be cautious in makingjudgments concerning the rationalityof this behavior.
The informationweights were not consistent with the naive Bayesian model, in which information from the same source was accordeda weight that was independentof the particularrisk
value. However, more complicated kinds of learning may be taking place. For example, the
most extreme departurethat was apparentis that high risk estimates by the polluting industry
play a dominantrole in situationsin which the governmentprovides the low risk assessment.
Given the substantialfinancialinterestthat the polluting industrywould have in not disclosing
the high risk level, particularlywhen governmentofficials believe that the risk is lower, one
might conclude that the risk must in fact be quite large for the industryto make such a disclosure. What is implied by the results is that the characteristicsof the learning process do not
satisfy a learningmodel in which respondentstreatthe credibilityof the risk informationsource
as independentof the stated risk values. The informationalcontext of the divergence of expert
opinions plays an importantrole in influencingrisk beliefs.

4. Smoking Behavior, Personal Characteristics,
Information

and the Processing of Risk

As a group, smokers face extremely high risks as part of their smoking activities, with
lifetime smoking-relatedmortalityrisks on the orderof 0.18-0.36 (Viscusi 1992b, p. 70). More15

The pertinent F-values are 2.95 for the high risk weights and 4.40 for the low risk weights, where the critical Fo.o5(1837)
value is 3.84.
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over, these mortality risks are the subject of substantial public information efforts, both on the
part of the government and the media. How do smokers think about risks in nonsmoking
contexts? Examination of the risk perceptions of smokers and their responses to this experiment
consequently may provide insight into whether smokers process risk information differently
than do nonsmokers, where this process may also be at work in determining their smoking risk
judgments. Smokers also may respond differently to risk information because they have smoked
in a context in which there have been competing extreme informational claims, particularly with
regard to the hazards of environmental tobacco smoke. This familiarity with self-interested
information provision may affect how smokers interpret risk information more generally.
The pooled information group results in Table 2 (column 2) indicate that, overall, smokers
have lower risk perceptions. However, this specification forces the effect of smoking status into
the constant term, which reflects prior beliefs, and does not permit smoking status to affect how
the information is processed. Once the smoker-risk information interaction terms are included
(Equation 3 of Table 2), smoking status alone is not influential in determining risk perceptions.
Smokers do not have systematically lower risk beliefs because of lower prior risk assessments.
Rather, their risk perceptions are lower because smokers place a lower weight on the high risk
information provided to them. The mean effect of this difference is to decrease their risk perceptions by 33 cases of cancer per million, or 11% of the sample mean. A useful comparison
is with actual smoker risk beliefs in the cigarette context. Smokers believe the lung cancer risks
due to smoking are 14% lower than do nonsmokers, which is a similar discrepancy in the level
of risk beliefs (Viscusi 1992b, p. 69). These lower smoking perceptions of smokers relative to
nonsmokers also significantly increase the probability that these individuals smoke (Viscusi
1992b, Chapter 5). Risk-taking activities such as smoking consequently reflect a self-selection
phenomenon in which the people who assess the activity as being relatively safe will be more
inclined to engage in it. Similar risk information processing in other domains also could account
for smokers' greater proclivity to engage in high-risk activities more generally. Smokers, for
example, are more likely to be injured at home, work on more hazardous jobs, are more likely
to be injured at work (controlling for objective job risks), require less compensation to bear
risk, and take fewer preventive actions (e.g., flossing one's teeth or checking one's blood pressure). 16
To explore the role of smoking behavior in greater detail, Table 4 reports the interactions
of these smoking status coefficients with the two risk information variables for each of the risk
information subsamples. In the case of the g-g information combination, smokers place a lower
weight on the high risk information presented to them, but not on the lower risk. The same is
true of the i-i risk information combination. The only exception is that in which the source of
the risk information is different. In the i-g case, smokers discount the industry's low risk
information altogether and place a lower weight on it. Smokers place the same weight on the
high risk information as do nonsmokers, but by discarding low risk information, smokers reduce
the point estimates of their risk perceptions in the i-g case by 95 cancer cases per million, or
31% of the sample mean. Taken at face value, this result would be consistent with the view
that smokers dismiss industry reassurances when the government claims the risk is higher. This
situation closely parallels real risk contexts in which government risk estimates are typically
greater. Smokers also have a much lower risk perception overall for the i-i case. Smokers will
16

See Hersch and Viscusi (1998) for documentation of these differences.
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Table 4. Selected Coefficients for Risk PerceptionRegressions with Smoking Interactionsa
Coefficients
(StandardErrors)
[Robustand ClusteredStandardErrors]

Low Risk
High Risk
Smoker
Smoker x Low Risk
Smoker x High Risk
R2

GovernmentGovernment

IndustryIndustry

GovernmentIndustry

IndustryGovernment

0.586*
(0.044)
[0.072]
0.535*
(0.028)
[0.030]
27.085
(24.652)
[16.555]
0.0009
(0.078)
[0.102]
-0.133*
(0.054)
[0.073]
0.84

0.432*
(0.047)
[0.085]
0.596*
(0.035)
[0.057]
2.898
(27.289)
[17.449]
0.108
(0.085)
[0.091]
-0.108*
(0.061)
[0.061]
0.82

0.332*
(0.058)
[0.068]
0.650*
(0.041)
[0.062]
14.973
(37.214)
[22.618]
-0.009
(0.106)
[0.112]
-0.033
(0.076)
[0.105]
0.83

0.448*
(0.073)
[0.065]
0.534*
(0.048)
[0.051]
31.213
(41.421)
[52.607]
-0.517*
(0.159)
[0.380]
0.090
(0.100)
[0.161]
0.80

Asterisksdenote coefficients that are statisticallysignificantat the 95% confidencelevel, one-tailedtest, using the
standarderrors.
heteroskedasticity-adjusted
aVariablesincluded in regressionbut not shown are age, age missing, nonwhiteor other race, male, education,income,
income missing, and single.

have the same risk perception as nonsmokersin the g-i case, in which the industry believes
the risks are higher than does the government,generally an atypical scenario.
When there is a consensus in risk beliefs, smokers will discount the high risk assessment,
and when industry assesses the risk as being lower than the government,smokers also have a
very low posterior risk assessment. Somewhat strikingly,when the smoker variable does not
interactwith the risk informationvariables,it is never statisticallysignificant(Table4). Smokers
do not differ significantly in their prior risk beliefs. The principal manner in which smokers
differ from nonsmokersis not differences in prior beliefs, but ratherdifferences in how they
process the risk informationthey receive.17

5. Conclusion
Decisions involving risk are complicated and are associated with a wide variety of documented anomalies in individualbehavior.It is not surprisingthat when these decisions become
17

Although smoking status is the key personalcharacteristicof policy interest,both maritalstatus and race also were
occasionally statisticallysignificantvariablesas well. To distinguishwhetherthese influencesrepresenta differencein
prior beliefs or the processing of information,the same statisticalexplorationsundertakenabove for smoking status
were also undertakenfor whether the respondentwas single or nonwhite. In each case, the demographicdummy
variableswere insignificant.The only significanteffect of single maritalstatusis that single respondentsplace a smaller
weight on the low risk assessmentin the i-i informationcase. Nonwhiterespondentsplace a greaterweight on the low
risk informationin the i-g case. Differences in processing informationseem to account for more risk perception
differencesthan do differencesin priorbeliefs.
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muddled further by the presence of conflicting risk judgments that people may not respond in
a fully rational manner to the risk ambiguities that are present. This study explored individual
risk judgments in the presence of conflicting risk information regarding the cancer risks from
hazardous chemicals. The possibility that there might be differing views from industry and
government scientists as well as different combinations thereof are reflected in a realistic portrayal of the kinds of disparate information that people may receive in actual risk contexts.
One way people might process conflicting risk information is to simply average expert
beliefs, treating them as being equally credible. This symmetric treatment may be rational, but
it is not a requirement for rationality. A more general formulation of rational learning is to treat
each information source in a consistent manner, which is appropriate in a world of nonoverlapping information. Respondents might, for example, weight government risk studies more than
industry studies. We designated this approach the "naive Bayesian" learning model.
Many of the results were consistent with the predictions of the naive Bayesian learning
model in which people weight the information based on its source and treat it as an independent
source of risk information. At the most fundamental level, risk judgments increased in the
expected direction with the risk assessments. Studies indicating higher risk levels boosted risk
perceptions. The steepness of this relationship satisfied the usual properties of a rational learning
process. The relative weights placed on the information, for example, sum to a value of approximately 1.0.
Some aspects of the behavior were not consistent with such a simplified learning model.
These anomalies provide a cautionary warning for those providing risk information in situations
where there is not a scientific consensus. In situations in which there are divergent risk judgments and where the identity of the parties is different, people are particularly likely to place
the greatest weight on the worst case scenario. This undue emphasis on the worst case possibility
is accentuated when there are different sources of risk information, as opposed to a single
information source but with different risk estimates. People are particularly skeptical of low
risk estimates from the polluting industry in situations in which the high risk estimate is from
the government agency. This dismissal of industry risk information in this context may reflect
the fact that people do not weight the industry risk information independent of the risk information context and the underlying economic incentives of the parties. When both of the risk
assessments are from the industry, however, people are less likely to dismiss the industry low
risk estimate.
Situations in which experts differ are consequently likely to generate alarmist responses to
dimly understood risks. These reactions in turn will create public pressures for stringent regulation. Regulators as individuals may be subject to the same biases, and to the extent that they
are responding to political pressures from an alarmed public, these biases will be reinforced.
The result, as is documented in Viscusi (1998), is that policies often reflect a variety of conservative biases in which there is excessive regulation of imprecisely understood risks, compared
to better known risks with higher mean risk values. This bias is a reflection of the same kinds
of risk judgment biases found in our study.
The behavior of cigarette smokers was particularly instructive because it afforded an opportunity to assess how smokers process risk information and make risk judgments in another
risk context. Controlling for other demographic characteristics, smoking status had an important
influence on risk beliefs. It is noteworthy that smokers do not differ from nonsmokers by simply
having lower prior probability values for the risk. There is not simply a difference in smokers'
prior beliefs. Rather, they process risk information differently than do nonsmokers. Overall,
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there is less of a tendency for nonsmokers to place a disproportionate weight on the high risk
assessments they receive.18 Moreover, smokers are particularly likely to dismiss the low risk
assessment by industry in situations in which the government is providing a higher risk value.
This situation parallels many risk contexts in terms of the respective role of industry and
government in providing divergent risk information estimates.
Making judgments regarding the rationality of smokers' information processing is more
problematic. If the behavior of nonsmokers serves as the rationality reference point, then smokers clearly fall short through their underestimation of risks. However, nonsmokers placed a
disproportionate weight on the high risk assessments and had a more exaggerated response to
risk information than would be predicted by a naive Bayesian learning model. Smokers' failure
to integrate risk information in the same manner as nonsmokers is not necessarily evidence of
irrationality. What is clear is that smokers are likely to process risk information in a manner
that is less sensitive to the high risk estimates they receive, with the result being lower risk
beliefs. This pattern of behavior for a nonsmoking risk context may explain in part why smokers
believe that the risks of smoking are less than do nonsmokers.19 Moreover, it may also help
account for the greater risk-taking behavior of smokers across a variety of domains of choice.

Appendix
Sample Description

Individualsparticipatingin the study were recruitedby a professionalmarketresearchfirm at a mall interceptin
Greensboro,North Carolina.This locale is not a universitytown and has demographiccharacteristicsreflective of the
U.S. populationmore generally (Table A1).20The respondentswere told that they would be participatingin a Duke
Universitystudy of city preferences.The sample for this study (TableAl) consistedof 143 adults.The mean sampleage
is 35 years old. Just underhalf of the sample is male, and the sample has an averageof 13 years of educationwith an
income of $28,000 per year.21The survey was undertakenin the late summerand fall of 1993.
Summaryof Survey Questions
Below, we providea brief summaryof the key sections of the survey used in this analysis.This summaryindicates
the survey structureand languagebut does not provide informationon all the iterationsthat were used to obtain indifference because these questions varied dependingon the particularrespondent.The order of the risk informationcombinationswas rotatedon a randombasis.
Each of the respondentsfocused on threeof the four scenarios.In every scenario,governmentand industryexperts
agree on the exact risk in area 2, whereasthe risk in area 1 was ambiguous.One scenariohas a governmentexpertand
an industryexpert to estimate the risk for area 1, the second scenariohas only industryexperts for area 1, and the final
scenariohas only governmentexperts for area 1. Each subject answeredtwo questions from each of the three scenarios
for a total of six responsesper subject.The following risk pairswere used randomizedover the six questions:(100, 300),
(200, 400), (100, 900), (10, 200), (80, 100), and (615, 715).

18

Speculatingon the reasons for this discrepancyis beyond the scope of this paper.Do smokersdiscount government
informationbecause they believe the governmenthas overstatedthe risks of smoking? Or do these people smoke
because they systematicallyignore such warningsand underestimatethe risk?
19For detailed statisticson the lung cancer and mortalityrisk beliefs of smokersand nonsmokers,see Viscusi (1992b).
20We explore the characteristicsof the sample populationat this locale in Viscusi and
Magat (1987) and Magat and
Viscusi (1992). For example, Greensborois not a college town and is a frequenttest marketingsite used by companies
and governmentagencies to assess public responsesto new productsand policies.
21 Individuals who reportedthemselves as black or "other" races were
oversampledrelative to the U.S. population.
Although the demographiccontrols will account for many of these differences,this sample is clearly not a nationally
representativerandomsample.
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Table Al. Summaryof Sample Characteristics
Variable

Age (years)
Age Missing (0-1 dummy variable [d.v.])
Nonwhite and Other (0-1 d.v.)
Male (0-1 d.v.)
Education(years)
Income (in annual 1993 dollars)
Income Missing (1-0 d.v.)
Single (0-1 d.v.)
Smoker (0-1 d.v. of currentsmoking status)
Low Risk (per million population)
High Risk (per million population)
Sample Size

Mean
(Standard Deviation)

34.832
(15.612)
0.049
(0.217)
0.385
(0.488)
0.441
(0.498)
13.381
(2.980)
28,189
(25,689)
0.133
(0.341)
0.524
(0.501)
0.287
(0.454)
184.17
(200.62)
439.17
(286.82)
143

The Survey
Some chemical companies cause air pollution, and this air pollution can cause cancer. In other words, the factories that
make chemicals can make the air unhealthy to breathe.
Suppose that there are two chemical companies, one in area 1 and one in area 2. Both of these companies cause air
pollution, and their air pollution can cause cancer.
The company in area 1 is not exactly the same as the one in area 2, so the chance of getting cancer in each area is
different.
As we have done before, we will ask experts to estimate the chance of getting cancer from the pollution in each area.
But this time we are going to tell you who the experts are.
Some of the experts work for the government and some of the experts work for the companies that cause the pollution.
For area 1, the government expert and the company expert DO NOT AGREE. That is, the government expert thinks the
risk in area 1 is different than what the company expert thinks.
A lot of research has been done in area 2, and the scientists have learned the exact risk of cancer from air pollution. The
government expert and the company expert both agree on this number.
The company in area 1 is not exactly the same as the one in area 2, so the chance of getting cancer in each area is
different.
As we have done before, we will ask experts to estimate the chance of getting cancer from the pollution in each area.
But this time we are going to tell you who the experts are.
Some of the experts work for the government and some of the experts work for the companies that cause the pollution.
For area 1, the government expert and the company expert DO NOT AGREE. That is, the government expert thinks the
risk in area 1 is different than what the company expert thinks.
A lot of research has been done in area 2, and the scientists have learned the exact risk of cancer from air pollution. The
government expert and the company expert both agree on this number.

Smoking and Ambiguous Risk Evidence
Yourchance
in a million
of cancer

AREA 1

269

AREA 2

GOVERNMENTEXPERT

COMPANYEXPERT

GOVERNMENTAND COMPANY
EXPERTSAGREE

100

300

200

If you had to make a choice, which area would you ratherlive in?
1. AREA 1
2. AREA 2
3. Both areas are the same to me
Press the numberthat goes with your answer
[suppose area 1 is chosen]
Yourchance
in a million
of cancer

AREA 1

AREA 2

GOVERNMENTEXPERT

COMPANYEXPERT

100

300

GOVERNMENTAND COMPANY
EXPERTSAGREE
200
180

YOU CHOSEAREA 1
Suppose the risk in AREA 2 was lower than before, as shown by the new numberabove.
If you had to make a choice, whick area would you ratherlive in?
1. AREA 1
2. AREA 2
3. Both areas are the same to me
Press the numberthat goes with your answer
Good! Press 0 for anotherquestion.
Yourchance
in a million
of cancer

AREA 1

AREA 2

COMPANYEXPERT 1

COMPANYEXPERT2

GOVERNMENTAND INDUSTRY
EXPERTSAGREE

200

400

300

THEREIS NO GOVERNMENTINFORMATIONABOUT AREA 1.
BOTH EXPERTSIN AREA 1 WORK FOR THE CHEMICALCOMPANIES.
If you had to make a choice, which area would you ratherlive in?
1. AREA 1
2. AREA 2
3. Both areas are the same to me
Press the numberthat goes with your answer
[suppose area 2 is chosen]
Yourchance
in a million
of cancer

AREA 1

AREA 2

COMPANYEXPERT1

COMPANYEXPERT2

200

400

GOVERNMENTAND INDUSTRY
EXPERTSAGREE

YOU CHOSEAREA 2
Suppose the risk in AREA 2 was higher than before, as shown by the new numberabove.
If you had to make a choice, which area would you ratherlive in?
1. AREA 1
2. AREA 2
3. Both areas are the same to me
Press the numberthat goes with your answer
Good! Press 0 for anotherquestion.

300
330

270
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Yourchance
in a million
of cancer

AREA 1

AREA 2

GOVERNMENTEXPERT1

GOVERNMENTEXPERT2

GOVERNMENTAND INDUSTRY
EXPERTSAGREE

615

735

675

THEREIS NO COMPANYINFORMATIONABOUT AREA 1.
BOTH EXPERTSIN AREA 1 WORKFOR THE GOVERNMENT.
If you had to make a choice, which area would you ratherlive in?
1. AREA 1
2. AREA 2
3. Both areas are the same to me
Press the numberthat goes with your answer
Yourchance
in a million
of cancer

AREA 1

AREA 2

GOVERNMENTEXPERT1

GOVERNMENTEXPERT2

615

735

GOVERNMENTAND INDUSTRY
EXPERTSAGREE
675
650

YOU CHOSEAREA 1
Suppose the risk in AREA 2 was lower than before, as shown by the new numberabove.
If you had to make a choice, which area would you ratherlive in?
1. AREA 1
2. AREA 2
3. Both areas are the same to me
Press the numberthat goes with your answer
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